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ABSTRACT
In the debate about who controls the meaning of the Constitution, popular
constitutionalism appears to be losing. Popular constitutionalist methods for popular
input into the evolving meaning of the Constitution account for a diminishing fraction
of changes to constitutional meaning over time. Social movements remain rare,
Congress is increasingly dysfunctional, and recent presidential proclamations and
executive orders have not engaged constitutionalism with the degree of specificity
necessary to influence the meaning of the Constitution. Focusing on these traditional
methods, it appears that judicial supremacy has won and that courts exercise nearexclusive control over the meaning of the Constitution.
In this Article, I argue that such appearances are deceiving. As the debate between
popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy faded from legal scholarship a
decade ago, new descriptive and normative accounts of agencies as actors involved
in determining the meaning of the Constitution have emerged. Administrative
agencies, through their statutory implementation and enforcement roles, are involved
in the application of constitutional principles embedded in statutes. While agencies
lack the popular pedigree of Congress and the President, these implementation and
enforcement decisions often involve the people either formally through notice-andcomment rulemaking or informally through interest group and social movement
engagement. Although not labeled “popular constitutionalism,” these forms of popular
engagement with agencies that have been richly explored in the historical and
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normative accounts of administrative constitutionalism should be understood as forms
of popular constitutionalism.
Beyond connecting administrative constitutionalism to popular constitutionalism,
this Article will identify another means by which agencies through their actions
involve the people in constitutional meaning determinations. This account requires a
shift in focus from the popular inputs into administrative constitutionalism to the
outputs from administrative constitutionalism. I show through the example of recent
administrative actions enforcing the Fair Housing Act how administrative actions
serve as catalysts for popular debate about the constitutional principles embedded in
statutes and the means by which these constitutional principles should be applied.
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INTRODUCTION
Over a decade ago, Larry Kramer, one of the leading advocates of popular
constitutionalism, issued a scholarly call to arms in the fight against judicial
supremacy. Lamenting judicial assertions of control over the meaning of the
Constitution, Kramer implored scholars to explore institutional alternatives
that provide for greater popular input into constitutional meaning
determinations. He asserted that we should no longer accept the notion that
“popular constitutionalism can’t work, so turn the Constitution over to the
Court.”1 Instead, “[w]e should . . . be asking what kind of institutions we can
construct to make popular constitutionalism work, because we need new ones.
We need to start rethinking and building institutions that can make
democratic constitutionalism possible. And we need to start doing so now.”2

1
2

Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006) [hereinafter Kramer, Response].
Id.
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Despite this call, popular constitutionalism remains a theory in search of
a workable method.3 The theory of popular constitutionalism is rather clear:
the people should have the final say in determining the meaning of the
Constitution.4 It counters the notion that the Court is the supreme authority
over constitutional meaning—which is the approach preferred by the
Supreme Court and many constitutional scholars.5 Judicial supremacy, the
popular constitutionalists argue, is contrary to the Framers’ intent, historical
constitutional practice, and our democratic system of government.6
While clear at the level of theory, the suggested methods for
implementing popular constitutionalism remain vague and underdeveloped.
Popular constitutionalists agree that the formal process for amending the
Constitution under Article V is an inadequate channel for popular input into
constitutional meaning.7 The barriers to passing an amendment through this
formal channel are too high, resulting in amendments that are too few and
far between to keep up with evolving societal values.8

3 See, e.g., Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 166 (2012)
(describing critics’ fears that the institutional solutions that prominent popular constitutionalists
suggest to implement popular constitutionalism “are too radical” because they would “undermine
judicial authority and result in majoritarian tyranny”); Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and
Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 340 (2008) (“[P]opular
constitutionalists have not yet specified the precise means by which the American people are to provide
their answers to the nation’s reasonably contested constitutional questions.”).
4 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and
the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2007) (explaining that the theory
of popular constitutionalism “does not assume that authoritative legal interpretation can take place
only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally valid process of interpretation can be undertaken
in the political branches and by the community at large”).
5 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“The design of the Amendment
and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”); Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359,
1359 (1997) (offering a critique of constitutionalism outside of the courts and a defense of judicial
supremacy); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (2001) (describing the
widespread approval of “the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional
interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone”).
6 See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 128-44 (2005) (discussing the history of opposition to judicial authority by
Republicans in the early decades of the republic).
7 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 380 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage] (“Article V
amendments are so very rare that they cannot provide an effective avenue for connecting
constitutional law to popular commitments.”).
8 This is reflected in the fact that only seventeen amendments have been ratified in the 225 years
since the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Most of these amendments are in the category of procedural
amendments rather than amendments that represent the evolving constitutional values of the people.
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From this point of agreement, popular constitutionalists diverge. One
variant of popular constitutionalism argues for a direct form of popular input
into constitutional meaning determinations similar to that demanded by the
Article V amendment process but without the same high procedural barriers.9
Central to this account are mass social movements that engage in dialogue
with counter-movements and the courts to influence the meaning of the
Constitution. The prime example of such direct popular constitutionalism is
the second feminist movement of the 1970s.10 Although the movement failed
in its effort to pass the Equal Rights Amendment to protect the equality of
the sexes, it did succeed through its dialogue with counter-movements and
the courts in changing judicial doctrine to incorporate gender equality
principles into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.11
Other twentieth-century examples of direct popular constitutionalism
include: (1) the civil rights movement, which inspired a broader principle of
racial equality more protective of African Americans and a statutory regime
focused on prohibiting racial discrimination;12 (2) the gun rights movement,
which informed a constitutional principle protecting the individual right to
bear arms;13 and (3) the gay rights movement, which influenced the
9 See, e.g., 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 26-32 (2014) (arguing that constitutional
changes through constitutional moments supplement the Article V constitutional amendment
process); Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case
of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 27 (2005) (contending that “Article III, not Article
V, has been the great vehicle of constitutional development” with social movements profoundly
shaping judicial interpretations of the Constitution); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: IdentityBased Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 499 (2001) (describing how
constitutional change occurs outside of the formal Article V amendment process through the
enactment of super-statutes and “dynamic interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court”
arising from the influence of identity-based social movements); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender
and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (identifying a
process of constitutional change outside the formal Article V amendment process that involves social
movement mobilization, countermobilizations, and dialogue between the people and the courts).
10 See infra Part II.
11 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (2003) (noting that the Court’s “sex discrimination
jurisprudence . . . was educated by the evolving constitutional beliefs and values of nonlegal actors,
as manifested by congressional legislation”); Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 385 (“The
contemporary constitutional law of sex discrimination . . . first appeared when the Court was able
to perceive points of convergence in the nation’s understanding of women as equal citizens that
emerged within debates between those who opposed and those who embraced the ERA.”); Reva B.
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) (arguing that the “equal protection doctrine
prohibiting sex discrimination was forged in the Equal Rights Amendment’s defeat”).
12 See, e.g., CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 39-114, 240-68 (2014) (describing the instrumental role of the civil rights movement
in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
13 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191, 239-45 (2008) (describing the influence of a mobilized gun rights movement on
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development of constitutional principles of sexual autonomy and antidiscrimination against LGBT people.14
Direct popular constitutionalism provides an important popular
counterweight to judicial supremacy. But social movements that succeed in
changing the Constitution are not that common. The scarcity of examples of
direct popular constitutionalism relative to the aggregate number of changes in
constitutional meaning that the Court makes suggests that the general pattern
of judicial control over constitutional meaning remains mostly undisturbed.
Another variant of popular constitutionalism identifies more indirect forms
of popular constitutionalism mediated through elected and accountable
institutional actors.15 For mediated popular constitutionalists, the primary focal
points are Congress and the President.16 The political branches make
constitutional meaning determinations through the enactment and
enforcement of statutes, executive orders, presidential speeches, and

the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller interpreting the Second Amendment to protect an
individual right to bear arms).
14 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2066 (2002) (describing how
“[identity-based social movements] have moved public norms away from understanding race, sex,
and sexual orientation as malign variations toward understanding them as tolerable and (for race and
sex) benign variations” (emphasis in original)).
15 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that Congress can assert its historic
role in the creation of constitutional meaning during a time when the “[Supreme] Court employed
doctrines of deference to vindicate democratic values in constitutional interpretation, defining the
scope of federal power in terms that gave great weight to Congress’s judgments about the nation’s
needs and interests”); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1837, 1837 (2009) (arguing that constitutional developments in recent decades “are episodes in
presidential popular constitutionalism”); see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602 (2003) (describing how popular constitutionalism is mediated through
the courts, which “play[] an important role in identifying those constitutional values that achieve
widespread popular support over time”).
16 See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1069, 1081 (2006) (drawing attention to a method of presidential constitutionalism
through the use of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1338 (2001) (“Congress, not the Court, is often best
situated to make the judgments necessary to create a Constitution of relevance to Americans today.”);
Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2004) (“Because both the President and the Congress are agents of the
people’s will, popular control of constitutional meaning demands that Congress and the President must
be free to make and act on their own interpretations of the Constitution.”); Purdy, supra note 15, at 1844
(describing presidential inaugural addresses as instruments of presidential constitutional
interpretation); see also Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial
Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 1005-06 (2010) (arguing for the placement of unreviewable
constitutional interpretive authority in the federal trial courts); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2064-66 (2010) (arguing for elected state judiciaries
as institutions capable of advancing popular constitutionalism).
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presidential signing statements.17 Because Congress and the President are
directly elected by the people, their decisions regarding constitutional meaning
are considered a form of constitutionalism that is responsive to the values of
the people.18
Mediated forms of popular constitutionalism through Congress and the
President account for a broader swath of constitutional meaning
determinations than direct popular constitutionalism. But this more
institutionalist account of popular constitutionalism leaves out an important
vehicle for popular constitutional lawmaking that has been historically
prominent and is even more important today: administrative agencies.19
Understanding the role of administrative agencies in popular
constitutionalism requires disaggregating constitutionalism, linking
administrative actions to a form of constitutionalism, and then recognizing
the multiple modes of administrative engagement with the public.
Popular constitutionalists have glossed over a critical distinction between
two aspects of constitutionalism—the distinction between constitutional
principle elaboration and constitutional principle application. Direct and
mediated forms of popular constitutionalism foreground the people and the
people’s representatives in the elaboration of constitutional principles. Such
principles include gender, racial, and sexual orientation equality; sexual and
bodily autonomy; the individual right to bear arms; and the right to marry who
one chooses. The articulation of these constitutional principles has captured the
imagination of popular constitutionalists. But the level of generality at which
these principles are elaborated means that intermediaries are needed to actually
regulate conduct. These intermediaries come in the form of standards, rules,
and other forms of constitutional principle applications.
For example, the constitutional principle of gender equality requires a
standard or rule to determine whether a state employer’s exclusion of women
from pregnancy benefits or a state-law grant of hiring preferences for veterans
over nonveterans (when most veterans are men) is inconsistent with the
principle. Social movements, Congress, and the President are certainly
involved in the development and enforcement of constitutional principle
applications. But such applications typically lack the popular salience of
17 Franklin, supra note 16, at 1069 (noting that “popular constitutionalism in 2006 may in
practice mean presidential popular constitutionalism”); Purdy, supra note 15, at 1837 (noting “the role
of the President as a popular constitutional interpreter, articulating and revising normative accounts
of the nation that interact dynamically with citizens’ constitutional understandings”).
18 See, e.g., Kramer, Response, supra note 1, at 1176-77.
19 No popular constitutionalist scholar has specifically suggested that agencies as institutions
are capable and situated to implement popular constitutionalism. For instance, Larry Kramer
describes the disagreement about interpretive methods as “centered on which institution or
institutions had power to interpret: Congress, the President, the courts, the states, or the community
at large.” Larry Kramer, Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (2006).
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constitutional principle elaboration and therefore do not motivate as much
social movement activity. Similarly, Presidents, in their platforms and
speeches, typically emphasize broader principles over narrower applications.
Statutes and executive orders therefore serve as the primary means of
congressional and presidential engagement with constitutional applications.
During active periods of lawmaking that involve the enactment of broad
statutes with direct constitutional implications, Congress, through its
engagement with the people and dialogue with the courts, fills much of the
gap in popular constitutional lawmaking. But such active periods of
congressional lawmaking are rare. In fact, with the exception of two brief
periods—post-9/11 and the first two years of the Obama presidency20—the
new norm over the past twenty years is one of congressional dysfunction and
gridlock in which even ordinary lawmaking is nearly impossible.21 Presidents
have stepped into this breach using executive orders and presidential
memoranda as lawmaking devices.22 But while there are high profile
examples, such as President Obama’s memorandum establishing the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrival policy and President Trump’s executive order
banning entry into the United States by individuals from mostly Muslimmajority counties, executive orders and presidential memoranda rarely
function as tools advancing constitutional principles and applications.23
Contrary to the current popular constitutionalist account, Congress and the
President are not always the primary institutional vehicles for popular
engagement with the Constitution. Administrative agencies are critical
components of the popular constitutionalist project.
Congress often delegates to agencies the authority to enforce statutes
advancing constitutional principles. In their role enforcing statutes
implicating constitutional principles, agencies often engage in dialogue with
the people and the courts in their development and enforcement of particular
constitutional applications. My prior work on administrative constitutionalism
emphasizes popular input into administrative actions through the notice-and20 See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 94 (2015)
(describing these two periods as historically strong periods of congressional lawmaking).
21 See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006).
22 See Jessica Stricklin, The Most Dangerous Directive: The Rise of the Presidential Memoranda in
the Twenty-First Century as a Legislative Shortcut, 88 TUL. L. REV. 397, 410 (2013) (describing
presidential memoranda and executive orders as “vehicles to enact significant policy change with the
force and effect of law without any legislative interference”).
23 See Jessica Arco, A DREAM Turned Nightmare: The Unintended Consequences of the Obama
Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Policy, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 493, 507-10
(2014) (describing the Obama’s administration deferred action for childhood arrival policy); see also
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,780,
82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
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comment rulemaking procedure.24 But while this is an important aspect of
popular engagement with administrative actions, it is neither sufficient nor
necessary to satisfy the mandate of popular constitutionalism.25
Public engagement with the Constitution requires a catalyst that
nationalizes a debate about constitutional principles and their applications.
Courageous human acts such as Rosa Parks’ decision to disobey a Jim Crow
law and sit at the front of a Birmingham bus sparked a civil rights movement
that ultimately triggered a national debate about the constitutional meaning
of equal protection as applied to race.26 Books such as Betty Friedan’s The
Feminine Mystique and the creation of the National Organization for Women
inspired a second feminist movement focused on women’s liberation and a
constitutional goal of gender equality.27 Events like the Black Panthers’ armed
protest on the steps in the California capitol building and the assassinations
of Dr. Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy inspired state and federal
gun control measures, which in turn sparked a gun rights movement that
advanced a libertarian interpretation of the Second Amendment right to bear
arms.28 From a popular constitutionalist perspective, the importance of these
movements was not simply in the constitutional results achieved, but in the
process by which the broader public participated centrally in debates about
the meaning of the Constitution.
Congress and the President also serve as critical catalysts for national
constitutional debates. For Congress, the spark is often the adoption of statutes
that apply or implicate the Constitution. But it could also be a hearing that
24 See Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 576
(2015) (identifying the notice-and-comment rulemaking process as a tool by which agencies can
obtain public input and “engage in a deliberative process of constitutionalism resistant to the
demands of ordinary politics”).
25 The notice-and-comment procedure is not sufficient because the public involved in the
process usually comprises a narrow slice of interested and elite actors. See, e.g., Marissa Martino
Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 245, 252-255 (1998) (finding interest group and other elite
actor domination in the notice-and-comment process across environmental, transportation, and civil
rights agencies). The notice-and-comment procedure is not necessary because other types of agency
actions can involve the public in debates about the meaning of the Constitution. See infra Part IV.
26 See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery
Bus Boycott, 1955-1957, 9 L. & HIST. REV. 59, 59 (1991) (“Considerable attention has naturally
focused on the Montgomery bus boycott that signaled the start of the modern civil rights movement
in December, 1955, when Rosa Parks refused to go to the back of the bus.”).
27 See Becky Thompson, Multiracial Feminism: Recasting the Chronology of Second Wave Feminism,
28 FEMINIST STUD. 336, 338 (2002) (“Normative accounts of the Second Wave feminist movement
often reach back to the publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique in 1963, the founding
of the National Organization for Women in 1966, and the emergence of women’s consciousnessraising (CR) groups in the late 1960s.”).
28 See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 247-58 (2013) (tracing the inspirations for and enactment of gun control legislation in the
1960s and the ensuing pushback from supporters of broader gun rights).
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Congress holds on a constitutionally-related issue or a judicial confirmation
process that raises constitutional issues that draw public attention. Presidents
often inspire public debates about the Constitution through their campaigns
for the office, through speeches once in office such as the inauguration speech
or State of the Union speeches, and through executive actions such as executive
orders that apply or implicate the Constitution.
Finally, and most relevant here, administrative agencies also bring about
popular constitutional debates through their actions. The impetus can come in
the form of a rule adopted through notice-and-comment procedures. But more
frequently, the catalyst arises from an agency’s decision to initiate or join a
lawsuit, a congressional hearing involving agency heads, or agency heads’ direct
engagement with the people through speeches or opinion editorials.
In this Article, I describe an example of an administrative action setting
off a national debate about the application of a constitutional principle: the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) decision to
intervene in a lawsuit seeking enforcement of a desegregation mandate under
the Fair Housing Act. This action triggered a public debate that played out
in the media and in 2016 presidential campaign discussions about segregation
and federal power that directly implicated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.29
HUD’s action not only catalyzed national debates about critical
constitutional issues, it also facilitated a dialogue between the people and the
courts. This process points to a final important feature of popular
constitutional theory. For most popular constitutional theorists, popular
constitutionalism means more than a national debate on a constitutional
issue. It also means communicating popular constitutional views to the actor
usually responsible for making final determinations about the meaning of the
Constitution—courts. Social movements, Congress, the President and
agencies open the line of communications through actions that serve as
catalysts for national constitutional debates. Courts can then act on what they
learn through their judicial review of those very catalysts of national
constitutional debate, such as statutes, executive orders, agency rules, and
agency-involved lawsuits.
In the rest of this Article, I develop the case for administrative
constitutionalism as a form of popular constitutionalism. In Part I, I broadly
outline the theory of popular constitutionalism and the different methods
advanced thus far for public input into constitutional meaning
determinations. In Part II, I identify an important oversight in popular
constitutionalism: the failure to disaggregate constitutionalism. I separate
constitutionalism into two parts—constitutional principle elaboration and
29

See infra Part IV.
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constitutional principle application—and provide examples of both. I show
how constitutional applications play a central role in defining the meaning
and scope of constitutional principles.
In Part III, I show how agencies are involved in constitutionalism through
their enforcement of statutes implicating or advancing constitutional
principles. I then theorize about when and how administrative
constitutionalism functions as a form of popular constitutionalism by
triggering national constitutional debate and creating a communicative
pathway between the people and the courts. I conclude Part III by arguing
that administrative agencies are now a critical institutional vehicle for popular
constitutionalism in the current context of legislative dysfunction. In Part IV,
I present an example of administrative constitutionalism as popular
constitutionalism: HUD’s actions to enforce the affirmatively further fair
housing mandate under the Fair Housing Act.
I. THEORIES OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
Popular constitutionalism is a simple theory with a constellation of
approaches that seek to operationalize it. According to the theory, the people
should be involved in determining the meaning of the Constitution.30
Implicit within this normative prescription is the view that the Constitution’s
meaning is not fully determined by its text. Open-ended textual requirements
for freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection combined with
implicit principles of federalism and separation of powers require not only
interpretation relying on textual tools, legislative history, and past public
understandings of meaning, but also construction according to the evolving
values of society.31
The popular constitutionalist foil is judicial supremacy. According to the
more extreme judicial supremacist account, courts should have the exclusive
and final say over the meaning of the Constitution; the less extreme account
suggests that courts should have the final say in that their judgments about the
meaning of the Constitution are final.32 In the 1950s, the liberal Warren Court
planted the seeds of judicial supremacy in its fight against massive resistance
from state and local officials to the Court’s school desegregation mandate in

30 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 961
n.3 (2004) (“‘Popular constitutionalism’ refers to the idea that authority to interpret and enforce the
Constitution is not deposited exclusively or ultimately in courts . . . but remains in politics and with
‘the people themselves.’”).
31 See Pettys, supra note 3, at 339 (“Because many of the Constitution’s provisions are openended in their language, the Constitution’s meaning is often highly contested.”).
32 See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539,
1550 (2005) (describing two versions of judicial supremacy).
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Brown v. Board of Education.33 The Court in Cooper v. Aaron explained that its
constitutional determinations must prevail over those of the people’s
representatives because Article III of the Constitution (as interpreted in
Marbury v. Madison) gave the Court exclusive and final say over the
document’s meaning.34 Another principle animating the liberal judicial
supremacist argument was that the Court, as a counter-majoritarian
institution, needed to have the exclusive and final say over the Constitution in
order to protect the rights of minorities against the tyranny of the majority.35
In the 1990s, the more conservative Rehnquist Court peeled judicial
supremacy away from its liberal, rights-protective roots and advanced an
institutional argument for exclusive and final authority over constitutional
meaning that was based on separation of powers and federalism. The
divergence from the liberal roots of judicial supremacy is perhaps best
exemplified by the Rehnquist Court’s employment of the doctrine as a
justification for striking down democratically enacted laws protective of
minority rights.36 Separation of powers and federalism, according to the
Court, prohibited the people’s representatives from protecting rights beyond
those the Court already protected in its constitutional jurisprudence.37
Both manifestations of judicial supremacy agree that the Constitution is not
ordinary law whose meaning should be determined through simple majoritarian
politics.38 Instead, the Constitution is considered higher law that requires
33 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (remanding school segregation cases to district courts and
instructing them to “enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the
parties to these cases”).
34 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
35 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 827-28 (2002) (“Judicial supremacy . . . is regarded ‘as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system’ because the Court alone functions as a
countermajoritarian institution securing the liberties of individuals and political minorities.”
(quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18)).
36 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (finding that
employees of the State of Alabama could not recover monetary damages for to the state’s failure to
comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
66-67 (2000) (finding that Florida state employees could not recover monetary damages for the
state’s failure to comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down a federal act protecting religious freedom as exceeding
congressional enforcement authority).
37 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (advancing a separation-of-powers and judicial-competency
rationale for judicial supremacy over constitutional meaning determinations); see also Robert C.
Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 2627 (2003) (elaborating on the rationale underlying the Court’s claim of judicial supremacy over
constitutional meaning determinations in Flores).
38 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 865 (1999) (construing the judicial-supremacy premise advanced in Flores as based on a
distinction drawn between constitutional interpretation and ordinary lawmaking).
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politically independent courts to make decisions about its meaning on the basis
of reasoned deliberation.39 The only role for the people in constitutional
meaning determinations, consistent with the Supreme Court’s account of
judicial supremacy, is through the Article V amendment process, which provides
a deliberative, super-majoritarian means for changing the Constitution.40
Popular constitutionalists reject the judicial supremacist account of
constitutional meaning determination, but there is some variation within
their theories that brings to light differences in popular constitutionalist
methodology. In the following, I distinguish between direct and mediated
forms of popular constitutionalism.
A. Direct Popular Constitutionalism
For some popular constitutionalists, whom I label direct popular
constitutionalists, the problem with judicial supremacy is not the assertion that
courts have the final say in determining constitutional meaning. Rather, it is
the insistence that courts determine the meaning of the Constitution to the
exclusion of direct popular input.41 The basis for this disagreement is both
descriptive and normative. As a descriptive matter, direct popular
constitutionalists argue that constitutional meaning determinations often occur
through dialogue between the people and the courts.42 For example,
constitutional change sometimes occurs when social movements secure support
for their rights claims from a broader segment of the people and the people’s
institutional representatives.43 The Supreme Court, concerned about
preserving its popular legitimacy while functioning as an unelected and
unaccountable institution, tethers itself to evolving societal values through
recognition of those rights claims that secure broader public support. The

Id.
See Flores, 521 U.S. at 529 (rejecting congressional assertion of authority over substantive
constitutional meaning determinations because “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in
Article V”).
41 See Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, supra note 5, at 10 (rejecting the judicial supremacy claim
that the Constitution is ordinary law that is peculiarly the domain of the court and instead insisting
the Constitution is popular law “made by the people to bind their governors”).
42 See Post, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that “the Court . . . commonly constructs constitutional
law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with culture,” which Post defines as “the beliefs and values
of nonjudicial actors”).
43 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 300 (“[I]f judges have played the central role in articulating
constitutional norms in the American tradition, their understanding of the Constitution has been
deeply shaped by mobilized citizenry, acting through electoral processes, and outside of them.”).
39
40
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Court then transmits these rights claims through judicial doctrine that shifts
the meaning of the Constitution.44
The principal example of such direct popular constitutionalism repeated
in the literature is the dialogue between the second feminist movement and
the Court in the 1970s that led to a change in equal protection doctrine as it
related to sex discrimination.45 The second feminist movement targeted
barriers to the equality of women found in law, culture, and societal
expectations.46 Upon reaching adulthood, women were expected to get
married and take on the role of homemaker.47 Legal regulations denied
women financial autonomy by giving husbands control over their wives’
property and earnings and employment barriers limited many women to jobs
as secretaries, teachers, and nurses.48 The few women who were able to
overcome employment barriers and secure opportunities as lawyers, doctors,
and engineers often faced pay discrimination and denial of opportunities to
advance in their profession.49 When women became pregnant, they faced
more discrimination and were often forced out of the workplace.50
The second feminist movement secured an early, unexpected, victory with
the addition of sex as a category entitled to protection against employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51 In the years
that immediately followed, the victory proved hollow, as the agency
responsible for enforcing Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, failed to enforce the law to protect women from discrimination
in the workplace.52 In the early 1970s, the second feminist movement
expanded its focus beyond discrimination in the workplace and societal
expectations about gender roles to claims about female bodily autonomy
implicated in the abortion debate and societal inaction and insensitivity to
44 See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 419 (“The modern meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
owes much more to the power and norms of the civil rights and women’s liberation movements than
to the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers.”).
45 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 9, at 308-315 (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s sex
discrimination doctrine and how it was influenced by the second feminist movement).
46 See NANCY MACLEAN, THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 1945–2000, at 14-20 (2009).
47 Cf., SHEILA TOBIAS, FACES OF FEMINISM: AN ACTIVIST’S REFLECTIONS ON THE
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 4-6 (1997) (describing popular understandings of such traditional gender
roles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the works of writers who questioned those roles).
48 See id. at 12-13, 44-45 (discussing the limited rights and employment opportunities women
had in the nineteenth century).
49 See id. at 95-96 (describing the difficulties women faced in advancing in such positions due
to the expectation that they devote time to giving birth to and raising children).
50 See, e.g., id. at 132 (describing how female public school teachers were often forced to resign
when they became pregnant).
51 Intended as a “killer” amendment, the addition of sex as a category entitled to protection under
Title VII was enacted into law under the leadership of a congresswoman from Michigan. See id. at 81-82.
52 See MACLEAN, supra note 46, at 14.
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rape.53 The movement sparked congressional passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment to the Constitution in 1972, nearly fifty years after it was first
introduced in Congress.54 According to the amendment, “[e]quality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of sex.”55
Although the Equal Rights Amendment came up three states short of the
38 needed for ratification, the movement secured important gains.56 The
EEOC increased its aggressiveness in enforcing Title VII prohibitions on sex
discrimination.57 Congress overruled a Supreme Court decision interpreting
Title VII to not protect against pregnancy discrimination.58 And perhaps
most importantly, the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
shifted.59 In the century preceding the second feminist movement, the Court
first denied women protection from discrimination outright under the
Fourteenth Amendment.60 When the Court finally did subject a gender
discriminatory law to equal protection scrutiny, it upheld the law under the
most deferential form of review.61 In the midst of the second feminist
movement in the 1970s, a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson
recognized women as a suspect class, due in part to the fact that women
suffered a history of discrimination and lacked political power, and subjected
the law discriminating against women to strict scrutiny.62 In a later decision,
a majority of the Court settled on a determination that gender was a quasiId. at 23-26.
See Chronology of the Equal Rights Amendment, 1923–1996, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN,
https://now.org/resource/chronology-of-the-equal-rights-amendment-1923-1996/ [https://perma.cc/
C9C3-MXMG].
55 See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42979, THE PROPOSED EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 8 (2018).
56 See id. at 1.
57 For example, the EEOC issued a series of guidelines and regulations addressing varying forms
of employment discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (2018); Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2
(2018); Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2018).
58 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)) (overriding Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that a
pregnancy exclusion from an employer’s disability plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
59 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 382 (“The Court altered its understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause even though the Equal Rights Amendment [], which proposed to
use the procedures of Article V to amend the Constitution to prohibit discrimination based on sex,
was never ratified.”).
60 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (upholding a state law denying
women the right to vote after determining that voting was not a privilege or immunity of
citizenship); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (upholding a state law denying
women the opportunity to practice law).
61 See Goessart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1948) (upholding a gender-discriminatory
statute using a rational basis form of review).
62 411 U.S. 677, 685-88 (1973).
53
54
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suspect classification and subjected laws that classified on the basis of gender
to a lesser, but still rigorous, intermediate form of scrutiny.63
Supporting the direct popular constitutionalist account is the fact that the
Court’s new recognition of a constitutional principle of gender equality was not
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment as originally understood and
intended.64 Moreover, it is unlikely that the Court would have recognized this
principle in the absence of the second feminist movement; that the more rightsprotective Warren Court proved unwilling to recognize the constitutional
principle of gender equality provides some support for this prediction.65 The
winds of change in societal values, led by a social movement able to garner
support from the broader population and the people’s representatives, appeared
to inspire judicial recognition of the right to gender equality.
B. Mediated Popular Constitutionalism
Mediated popular constitutionalists suggest that the higher form of
lawmaking can also be satisfied when Congress and the President make
constitutional meaning determinations in response to claims by mass social
movements or widely held societal values.66 The paradigmatic examples of
mediated popular constitutionalism arising from representative institutional
engagement with mass social movements are the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 These laws were inspired by the surrounding
civil rights movement that led to a broader public debate about racial equality
and the constitutional requirements of equal protection.68
According to these theorists, popular constitutionalism is not merely a
description of an important pathway for constitutional change. It is also
normatively more desirable than the judicial supremacist alternative.
Constitutional change according to the judicial supremacist account should
be a judge-only affair. When the text is indeterminate, judges should
determine constitutional meaning on the basis of their own value judgments
of how the Constitution should respond to new and evolving societal
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162-64 (1979) (acknowledging that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not understood at the time of the Framing to protect women from discrimination).
65 See Goessart, 335 U.S. at 465-66 (“[T]hat women may now have achieved the virtues that
men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced,
does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes . . . .”).
66 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 266-268 (1991) (describing the mediated
popular constitutionalism process).
67 See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 5-7 (2014) (noting that it took the passage of
these laws to enshrine civil rights as a “fundamental premise of the modern republic”).
68 See supra note 12.
63
64

1798

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1783

contexts.69 But this judicial supremacist argument runs into a difficult
question in the context of a democratic republic: why should the values of
unelected and unaccountable judges decide the meaning of the Constitution
over the values of the people? Or to state differently, what gives judges the
authority to impose their values on the people when it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution?
For popular constitutionalists, there is no strict separation of law and
politics in which the Constitution is law and thus the domain of the courts
and ordinary law is politics and the domain of the people and the people’s
representatives.70 Instead, the Constitution is the people’s law and cannot be
separated from politics.71 This inseparability of law and politics does not mean
that the Constitution’s meaning should be determined and revised according
to the channels of ordinary majoritarian politics. The Article V amendment
process suggests that a higher form of politics should be required when
constitutional revision is the product of deliberation and engagement with
wide segments of the population. Instead, what mediated popular
constitutionalists argue is that dialogue between the people, the people’s
representatives, and the courts satisfies these requirements.72
Entirely overlooked in both popular constitutionalist accounts is the role
of agencies. Scholars of administrative constitutionalism have revealed
through descriptive accounts how agencies are extensively involved in
constitutional meaning determinations and have developed theoretical
arguments about the practice.73 I add to the burgeoning theory the argument
that administrative constitutionalism is a critical component of the popular
constitutionalist project. In the next Part, I argue that constitutional theorists
generally, and popular constitutional theorists in particular, have neglected the
69 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL REASONING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 127 (1996) (arguing that “the Constitution requires courts to exercise
moral judgment,” a task that judges have had to do “since law began”).
70 See Franklin, supra note 16, at 1074 (“[O]n the popular constitutionalist understanding, many things
we are used to thinking of as questions of ordinary law or policy turn out to be constitutional questions.”).
71 See id. (“[P]opular constitutionalism . . . places a heavy responsibility on the people and the
popular branches of government to develop, articulate, and carry out their own constitutional visions.”).
72 See, e.g., Post, supra note 11, at 37 (“The articulation of constitutional law thus requires ‘that
judges . . . participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people as well.’”
(quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992))).
73 For historical accounts of administrative constitutionalism, see, for example, Jeremy K.
Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016); Sophia Z.
Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present,
96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010); Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847 (2018); Karen
M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the
Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015). For more doctrinal or theoretical accounts of administrative
constitutionalism, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013); Ross, supra note 24.
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role of agencies because they typically fail to disaggregate constitutionalism.
Popular constitutionalists usually address constitutionalism at the level of
constitutional principal elaboration, while administrative constitutionalism is
often at the level of constitutional principle application. I show that the
popular constitutionalists’ fixation on principles comes at a cost in terms of
understanding not only the role of constitutional applications in shaping
principles, but also the role of institutions like administrative agencies in the
project of constitutionalism. In Part III, I argue that administrative agencies
in their application of constitutional principles serve as critical catalysts for
popular engagement with constitutional meaning, particularly in this current
era of political dysfunction and legislative stasis.
II. DISAGGREGATING CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalism is not a singular action. Instead, it has three different
components. The first component involves the interpretation of text.
Interpretations of text through the use of textualist tools, legislative history, or
the examination of contemporaneous public meaning rarely yield clear answers
about the constitutional meaning of the many open-ended constitutional
provisions that are often at the center of constitutional debates and
controversies.74 The second and third components, the elaboration of and
application of constitutional principles, are therefore the primary focal points
in constitutional meaning determinations involving open-ended constitutional
text. Constitutional principles “can be understood as the general sense of
obligation of the constitutional text.”75 Since it is often impossible to pin down
the specific meaning of open-ended, vague text, those that determine
constitutional meaning elaborate broader principles derived from sources such
as “contemporaneous statements of purpose, contemporary social movement
expressions of values, and Americans’ generalized sense of justice.”76 These
principles are elaborated at different levels of specificity, but what distinguishes
them from the third component of constitutionalism—constitutional
applications—is that they usually do not dictate an outcome in a particular
dispute about the constitutional permissibility of a state action. Instead,
principles must be applied. The third component of constitutionalism,
constitutional applications, “comprise[s] the rules, standards, and evidentiary
requirements employed to resolve specific constitutional disputes.”77
74 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 16 (2011) (acknowledging that some constitutional texts “are inherently open-ended and
cannot be understood using only semantic methods”).
75 Ross, supra note 24, at 540.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 541.
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A. Direct Popular Constitutionalism
Popular constitutionalists focus on the elaboration of constitutional
principles in their advocacy for a popular role in constitutional meaning
determinations. The social movements that the direct popular
constitutionalists describe have advanced principles of race and gender
equality, the individual right to bear arms, and LGBTQ rights, among others.
Rarely do social movements advocate at the level of specific constitutional
applications. To the extent that they do, such advocacy has been the nearexclusive domain of the more elite elements of the movement.78 One
explanation for social movements’ neglect of constitutional applications is
that they often lack the salience necessary to attract the popular support and
media attention to influence elites, elected officials, and ultimately courts.
Furthermore, to the extent that constitutional applications require deciding
issues that are sources of latent divisions within a movement, it is politically
prudent to leave any choice between constitutional applications undecided.
For example, the second feminist movement pushed a constitutional
amendment that would have established in the Constitution’s text the
principle of equal rights for women.79 As a principle, equal rights attracted
popular support and media attention. Elites rallied around the cry of equal
rights for women, and the combination of social movement pressure, elite
support, and media attention contributed to Congress’s decision to pass the
amendment with the necessary supermajority support.80 A majority of
Americans supported the ERA from the first time a polling organization
asked the question in the early 1970s until the struggle for ratification
officially ended in 1982.81
The principle of equal rights for women was broad and meant different
things to different movement supporters. The more liberal activists saw the
amendment as a tool to bring fundamental changes to gender roles, while the
more conservative traditionalists saw the amendment as formally recognizing
equal rights without necessarily upending the status quo.82 According to

78 See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative
Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 1466-78 (2005) (describing the dominance of social movement and
interest group elites in the constitutional advocacy surrounding the constitutionality of affirmative
action in higher education).
79 See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 8-9 (1996) (discussing the historical
origins of the Equal Rights Amendment).
80 See id. at 8-12 (tracing the gradual accumulation of support for the Amendment leading up
to its passage).
81 Id. at 14.
82 See id. at 26 (noting that while some supported the Amendment “only insofar as they [thought]
it [was] compatible with the status quo,” the Amendment’s more active advocates viewed it as a
“vehicle for bringing about substantive changes in men’s and women’s lives”).
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political scientist Jane J. Mansbridge, the implicit strategy of the movement
supporting the Equal Rights Amendment “was to get people to agree to the
principle of equal rights, enshrine that principle in the Constitution, and then
let the Supreme Court decide what this principle actually meant in
practice.”83 In other words, the constitutional amendment would recognize
the principle, but the courts would be responsible for applying it.
Direct popular constitutionalists have more broadly embraced this view
of constitutionalism. The dialogue between social movements and the courts
that the direct popular constitutionalists describe are ones in which the rights
claims are at the general level of principle. Direct popular constitutionalists
appear willing to concede constitutional applications to the exclusive domain
of courts. For example, when accounting for the judicial embrace of the
constitutional principle of equal rights for women, direct popular
constitutionalists do not differentiate between the Court’s two very different
judicial applications of the principle.
In the case of Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court embraced
the principle of equal rights for women and applied the principle through the
development of a heightened scrutiny standard to be applied to all laws that
discriminate against women.84 According to this constitutional application,
the principle of equal rights for women operates as an anti-subordination
principle that requires special judicial protection for historically subordinated
and politically marginalized women against state actor discrimination.85 The
plurality, however, could not secure the necessary fifth vote, leaving questions
regarding the application of the principle of equal rights for women open for
another three years.
When the Court revisited the constitutional principle in Craig v. Boren, it
applied intermediate scrutiny to a gender classification that discriminated
against men.86 The Court did not find that men were a subordinated class
entitled to special judicial protection. Instead, it determined that gender
classifications are almost presumptively impermissible because they are often
based on overbroad generalizations and stereotypes about the way men and
women are.87 According to Craig, the gender equality principle operates as an
anti-classification principle that protects men and women from gender
classifications based on generalizations and stereotypes.88
Id.
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1025-26 (1986) (treating Frontiero as a case recognizing the anti-subordination principle).
86 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
87 Id. at 198.
88 See Colker, supra note 85, at 1026 (interpreting Craig as promoting an anti-differentiation
approach to equal protection).
83
84
85
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The Court’s choice of an anti-classification standard has important
implications for the gender equality principle. First, and most obviously, the
anti-classification standard extended heightened scrutiny to laws that
discriminated against men, a category of laws to which the second feminist
movement did not pay much attention. Second, and more importantly, the
Court’s subsequent application of the anti-classification standard to
challenges of gender-discriminatory laws revealed a divergence between the
Court’s approach to equal rights for women and the goals of many of the
leaders of the second feminist movement.
A primary goal of the second feminist movement was breaking down
barriers to women in the workplace and advancing the economic autonomy
of women.89 Yet when the Court used the anti-classification standard to apply
the principle of equal rights for women, it resolved cases in a manner directly
contrary to the movement’s goals. For example, when addressing the
constitutionality of a state disability law that denied benefits to pregnant
women, the Court applying the anti-classification standard focused on the
question of whether the law classified on the basis of sex.90 The Court
reasoned that it did not since the law discriminated on the basis of pregnancy
status, not sex.91 If the Court had embraced the Frontiero anti-subordination
standard in adjudicating claims of gender discrimination, the resolution of
the controversy would likely have been more consistent with the feminist
movement’s goals. Since pregnancy discrimination is a tool to subordinate
women—the only class of individuals who can get pregnant—the disability
law would have been treated as presumptively unconstitutional because it
discriminatorily undermined the economic status of women.
Similarly, in a case addressing the constitutionality of a state hiring
preference for veterans that shut most women out of most state jobs because
veterans were overwhelmingly male, the Court, applying the anticlassification standard, upheld the state action.92 The Court determined that
despite the disparate impact of the law on a historically subordinated class of
women, the law did not classify people on the basis of gender because it was
not motivated by gender discrimination.93

89 See, e.g., Statement of Purpose, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (1996), https://now.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/Statement-of-Purpose.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT5G-FFF8] (emphasizing
the employment disadvantages that women face and promoting an equality of economic opportunity
for women).
90 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976).
91 Id. at 139-40.
92 Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979).
93 Id. at 279 (imposing on the female challenger to the disparately impactful state law a
requirement that she prove that the state adopted the law “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
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These two examples show the important function of constitutional
applications in shaping constitutional principles. The second feminist
movement’s principle of equal rights for women inspired by the historical
economic subordination and political marginalization of women was
transformed, through constitutional application, into a more neutral gender
non-classification norm.
B. Mediated Popular Constitutionalism
The constitutional principles developed through mediated popular
constitutionalism are usually elaborated at a more detailed level than those
transmitted through social movements. Constitutional principles advanced
through the lawmaking process of mediated popular constitutionalism can be
embedded within comprehensive and intricate statutes, rather than through
the vague, open-ended language of constitutional amendments, broad rights
claims, or salient rallying slogans. But even with this additional detail, the
constitutional meaning determinations advanced in statutes often lack specific
enough prescriptions to resolve disputes. This lack of specificity arises from
two primary sources. First is the inability of lawmaking institutions to secure
agreement on more specific applications of constitutional principles in
statutes. Legislatures often leave things undecided with the irresolution
evidenced in the vagueness of a statute.94 Second is the inability of Congress
to anticipate future contexts in which the statute will apply. An application of
a constitutional principle for which Congress can secure majority support in
the present might not be relevant to a context that Congress is unable to
foresee.95 In these situations of unforeseen contexts, the question of how the
statute should apply must be resolved in the particular dispute without the
guidance from the enacting Congress.
The common link among civil rights statutes enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is that they embrace the
antidiscrimination principle.96 But the statutes did not specify how the
94 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in
the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 550 (1994) (arguing that legislators use vagueness as an essential tool
to build the necessary support for a statute and avoid opposition from more concentrated interests).
95 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480
(1987) (arguing that unanticipated gaps and ambiguities arise in all statutes as society changes “and
generates new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute”).
96 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) (“No voting qualification of
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision [to deny or abridge] the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color . . . .”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)
(defining unlawful employment actions as the failure or refusal “to hire or to discharge any individual,
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principle applies. Did the statutes prohibit actions that have a disparate
impact, or only those actions that are motivated by a discriminatory intent?
Mediated popular constitutionalists do not contest the Court’s exercise of
domain over the choice of constitutional application even though that choice
inevitably shapes the constitutional principle.97 Similar to the gender equality
context, the choice between a disparate-impact and a discriminatory-intent
standard is a choice between different visions of anti-discrimination that has
real world consequences for what equality ultimately means.
C. Administrative Constitutionalism
Rich historical accounts of administrative constitutionalism by Sophia
Lee, Karen Tani, Jeremy Kessler, and Joy Milligan among others illuminate
administrative agencies’ role in applying constitutional principles.98 In the
article that gave the practice of administrative constitutionalism its name, Lee
focuses on instances in which the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the Federal Power Commission (FPC) creatively expanded and
narrowed the state action doctrine in their equal employment rulemaking.99
The constitutional principle of state action that arose from the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s language, “[n]o State
shall,” limited the amendment’s reach to state actions.100 Left unresolved in
the judicial elaboration of the constitutional principle was the question: what
is state action? Over time, the Court developed in case law many, sometimes
contradictory, applications of the state action principle.101 But what has been
mostly overlooked in constitutional accounts, and what was revealed in Lee’s
account, is the role of administrative agencies in developing parallel
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
97 For instance, in a case decided soon after the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, the Court
adopted a standard that would be used to apply the constitutional principle. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (adopting a disparate-impact standard for Title VII on the basis
of a finding that “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation” (emphasis in original); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70
(1980) (interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and finding that challengers to an election
law must prove that the law is motivated by a discriminatory purpose). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2012) (overturning Bolden and establishing a discriminatory-results test for claims brought under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
98 See generally supra note 73.
99 Lee, supra note 73, at 810-80 (describing how the FPC and FCC engaged in creative,
selective, and resistant interpretations of the state action doctrine).
100 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is
State action of a particular character that is prohibited [by the Fourteenth Amendment].”).
101 See Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine,
2016 BYU L. REV. 575, 581-604 (2016) (describing the doctrinal confusion surrounding the state
action doctrine).
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applications of the state action principle that were sometimes at odds with
those developed in judicial doctrine.102
Similarly, Karen Tani in her account of administrative equal protection
demonstrates how the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) was at the forefront in their application of the constitutional
principle of non-discrimination to recipients of public assistance.103 In its
evaluation of state welfare laws in the middle part of the twentieth century,
HEW expansively applied the constitutional nondiscrimination principle
through rigorous rational review of state welfare provisions—a constitutional
application that diverged from that of the courts.104
Finally, Joy Milligan’s examination of the Office of Education uncovers
an agency engaged in a more constrained application of the constitutional
principle of racial desegregation than advanced in the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence.105 In the wake of the Court’s elaboration of the racial
desegregation principle in Brown v. Board of Education, the Office of
Education determined that the principle did not require the denial of federal
funds to segregated schools in the face of political pressure from civil rights
groups, the White House, and other agencies.106
Each of these examples of administrative constitutional applications and
the many others described by scholars should be considered integral
components of constitutionalism. Since popular constitutionalists do not
disaggregate between constitutional principles and constitutional applications,
this administrative agency role in constitutional meaning determinations has
been overlooked.
The popular constitutionalists’ apparent willingness to concede
constitutional applications to the exclusive domain of courts undermines the
popular constitutionalist project in an important way. To the extent that
judicial choice of constitutional application is not responsive to public input,
the popular influence on constitutional principles is diluted by the ability of
an unelected and unaccountable court to shape the principles to accord with
its values through applications. In the next section, I describe the role of an
institution long ignored by popular constitutionalists—administrative
agencies—and advance the case that their role in constitutionalism should be
treated as a critical component of popular constitutional theory.
See Lee, supra note 73, at 810-80.
See Tani, supra note 73, at at 844-89.
Id. at 889 (describing the Court’s eventual rejection of HEW’s rigorous review of state
welfare operations after it had been applied for nearly a half century).
105 Milligan, supra note 73, at 876-914.
106 Id. at 901 (“Throughout both administrations, education officials held firmly to the
position that the Constitution did not empower or require them to prevent federal funds from
supporting segregation.”).
102
103
104
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY
A critique of administrative constitutionalism as a form of popular
constitutionalism arises from doubts about the popular pedigree of
administrative agency actions. Administrative agencies do not fit within
direct popular constitutionalist accounts because agencies are not typically
seen as focal points for social movement activity. Agencies also do not fit
within mediated popular constitutionalist accounts because the officials that
run them are not elected directly by the people.
While administrative constitutionalism might not have the same type of
connections to the public as direct and mediated forms of popular
constitutionalism, there is a range of administrative approaches to applying
constitutional principles that has varying relationships to the public.
Administrative applications are advanced through informal guidance letters
and directives for which career bureaucrats are often principally responsible,
guidelines that usually incorporate the input of agency heads directly
accountable to the President, and rules that are the product of agency heads,
career bureaucrats, and public input through a notice-and-comment process.107
Administrative applications of constitutional principles through rules that
are the product of public notice-and-comment have perhaps the strongest
claims to popular constitutionalism. In the notice-and-comment process, the
agency is required under the Administrative Procedure Act to give the public
notice of a proposed rule and an opportunity to submit comments to the
agency about the proposed rule.108 Public comments range from
unsophisticated expressions of support, concern, or opposition to the
proposed rule to more extended examination and recommendations for
alternatives to the proposed rule.109 Proposed rules adopted as regulations can
be challenged and held procedurally invalid if the agency fails to consider all
of the public comments and provide explanations for why it rejected
alternatives to the proposed rule.110 Administrators must therefore engage in
107 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (2012); see also Robert A. Anthony,
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1319-27 (1992) (providing a taxonomy of administrative
decisionmaking devices).
108 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
109 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,
414 (2005) (finding from an analysis of public comments “dramatic differences . . . in the extent of
specialized knowledge and technical sophistication reflected in comments from organized interests
versus those from individual members of the public”).
110 The courts enforce the mandate of a deliberative notice-and-comment rulemaking process
through “hard look review” of the process. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring under the arbitrary and capricious standard that the
“agency . . . examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”); see also Cass R.
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a deliberative process in which they consider and evaluate comments and
proposed alternatives, make any necessary adjustments to the rule, and when
they do revise the rule, resubmit it for additional public comment.
The notice-and-comment process can involve more direct public input into
constitutional applications than can participation in social movements, which
are focused more on principles in dialogue with courts that are then given carte
blanche discretion to develop constitutional applications on their own. In
addition, the notice-and-comment process involves at least as much public input
into constitutional applications as the constitutional meaning determinations
arising from mediated popular constitutionalism, since representatives tend to
have little knowledge about the specific preferences of their constituents on most
issues, even issues of constitutional import.111 Instead, elected representatives
tend to make decisions on the basis of preferences that they anticipate their
constituents might have, a much less concrete or direct form of public input than
notice-and-comment rulemaking.112
While popular constitutionalists have overlooked this important source of
popular input into constitutional decisionmaking, the notice-and-comment
process has its limits. Social science and legal scholars have demonstrated that,
in most contexts, elites dominate the notice-and-comment rulemaking process,
with interest groups and other elites submitting the overwhelming majority of
comments.113 However, it is important to note that the context in which elite
domination has been shown to be a little less prevalent—the notice-and-

Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 287 (1986)
(describing the goal of hard look review as “guard[ing] against the dangers of self-interested
representation and of factional tyranny of the regulatory process”).
111 See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and
the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 353 (2016) (describing surveys and studies showing that citizens
lack clear preferences on most policy issues).
112 Id. at 353-54 (elaborating on the anticipated preference theory, which suggests that
legislators act on the basis of preferences that they anticipate their constituents have on the basis of
how they might respond to policy decisions).
113 See, e.g., William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Process, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
66, 70-71 (2004) (finding in an analysis of forty-two rules that “the vast majority of comments come
from or are orchestrated by organized groups”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias
Toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006)
(finding after an examination of forty rules promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Employment Standards Administration and
the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Railroad Administration and Federal Highway
Administration that business interests submitted over 57% of the total comments, governmental
interests submitted 19% of the total comments, and public interest groups provided only 6% of the
total comments).
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comment process for rules involving social welfare and civil rights—is the
context in which many constitutional meaning determinations are made.114
Such empirical evidence, however, might not be sufficient to ameliorate
concerns about elite domination of the notice-and-comment process. And
even if sufficient, there is still the concern that many administrative
applications of constitutional principles are not made through the notice-andcomment process, but rather through other decisionmaking processes that
lack similar channels for direct public input.
It is thus important to recognize that agency actions applying constitutional
principles often engage the public in other ways—by triggering the
involvement of the public, elected officials, institutions, and candidates in a
debate about constitutional meaning. In a foundational article, Matthew
McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz famously modeled a rational approach to
congressional oversight over agency actions that is relevant here.115 According
to their model, congressional supervision of agency actions occurs through “fire
alarm” rather than “police patrol” oversight.116 In police patrol oversight,
“Congress examines a sample of executive agency activities, with the aim of
detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its
surveillance, discouraging such violations.”117 For Congressmembers motivated
by reelection, such police patrol oversight is an irrational waste of time and
resources. They will “inevitably spend time examining a great many executivebranch actions that do not violate legislative goals or harm any potential
supporters [and] detecting and remedying arguable violations that nonetheless
harm no potential supporters.”118 In addition, since Congressmembers
“examine only a small sample of executive-branch actions[,] they are likely to
miss violations that harm their potential supporters.”119
Such police patrol oversight is more costly to Congress than the
alternative fire alarm oversight. In employing fire alarm oversight, “Congress
establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable
individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative
decisions . . . to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals,
114 See Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 245, 252-54 (1998) (contrasting
the complete non-participation of individuals and citizen groups in the comment process for
Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Transportation Safety Agency rulemaking
with the broader involvement of citizen advocacy groups and individual citizen participation in
Department of Housing and Urban Development rulemaking).
115 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
116 Id. at 165-69.
117 Id. at 166.
118 Id. at 168.
119 Id.
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and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.”120 This form
of oversight allows Congress to focus on the agency actions that draw
attention from the public. Congressmembers will be motivated to supervise,
oversee, and check these agency actions, particularly when they impact their
supporters and by extension the congressmembers’ reelection prospects.
While McCubbins’s and Schwartz’s model focuses on Congress and the
use of procedures to trigger oversight, administrative applications of
constitutional principles are likely to trigger fire alarm oversight, since agency
actions tend to be salient to the public and elicit support from those
benefitted and opposition from those harmed by the constitutional
applications. Administrative constitutional applications that trigger fire
alarms are also likely to trigger reactions from courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, when the application diverges from that established by
doctrine. This judicial reaction can open the channels for a dialogic
relationship between the administrative agency through its action, the public
through its response, and the Court through its review.
Administrative law scholarship has explored in depth the notice-andcomment process and political control (congressional and executive oversight,
supervision, and direction) pathways of public input into administrative
decisionmaking. In the next Part, I focus on the third pathway of public input,
administrative constitutional applications as a catalyst for public input and
dialogue between courts and agencies. I examine this mechanism of popular
constitutionalism through an Obama-era example: the Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s rule applying a desegregation mandate in
the Fair Housing Act.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PRACTICE
In December 2006, the Anti-Discrimination Center of New York (ADC)
brought a qui tam action on behalf of the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) for damages under the False Claims Act
against Westchester County, New York.121 The ADC claimed that from 2000–
2009, Westchester County had “knowingly presented . . . to the United States
false claims to obtain federal funding for housing and community
development.”122 The ADC’s False Claims Act targeted Westchester County’s
receipt of federal funding under the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG), which required as a condition for receipt of such funding, that
Id. at 166.
See Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States of America, United States ex rel. AntiDiscrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (No. 06 2860), 2006 WL 6348390.
122 Id. at 2.
120
121
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Westchester “certify that it met a variety of fair housing obligations, including
the obligation to affirmatively further fair housing (‘AFFH’).”123
The “affirmatively further fair housing” obligation originally appeared in
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.124 The Act, which was passed in the wake of
the assassination of Martin Luther King and the riots that followed in
African American ghettos and slums throughout the country, had the twin
goals of banning housing discrimination and addressing residential
segregation.125 President Lyndon Johnson and members of Congress saw the
combination of housing discrimination and residential segregation as critical
contributing factors to the extensive poverty, lack of education, and
underemployment that plagued African American communities.126 The law
directly combated housing discrimination through prohibitions on the rental
and sale of housing and sought to address segregation through a requirement
that the Secretary of HUD administer the program in a manner that
affirmatively furthers fair housing.127
This AFFH mandate embedded within the 1968 Fair Housing Act
represented an application of the constitutional desegregation principle
established in Brown v. Board of Education.128 Yet even though Congress built
into the statute an enforcement regime that gave the administering agency
(HUD) more power than other agencies responsible for enforcing other civil

123 Id. at 3; see also Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2)
(2012) (requiring recipients of community development block grant funds under the Act to
“affirmatively further fair housing”); National Affordable Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(15)
(2012) (requiring recipients of community block grant funds to certify “that the jurisdiction will
affirmatively further fair housing”).
124 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012).
125 See, e.g., David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF.
L. REV. 5, 15 (2017) (describing the context surrounding the adoption of the Fair Housing Act and
the desegregation and antidiscrimination goals of the Act).
126 See Lyndon B. Johnson, Message from the President of the United States Proposing
Enactment of Legislation to Make Authority Against Civil Rights Violence Clear and Sure, H.R. Doc.
No. 432 (2d. Sess. 1966) [hereinafter Message from the President] (“It is self-evident that the problems
were are struggling with form a complicated chain of discrimination and lost opportunities.”); see also
Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection
on the Fair Housing Act’s Affirmatively Further Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 128-30 (2011) (describing
congressmembers’ views of the purpose and intended operation of the Fair Housing Act).
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (establishing the prohibitions on discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing); id. § 3608(e)(5) (2012) (“The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
shall . . . administer the program and activities relating to housing and urban development in a
manner affirmatively to further the policies of [fair housing].”).
128 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (determining that segregation in public schools is a denial of
equal educational opportunity, which is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
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rights laws,129 the constitutional commitment to housing desegregation
remained unrealized when the ADC brought its qui tam action against
Westchester County.130 Moreover, housing segregation, as a matter of
constitutional or statutory concern, was almost entirely absent from the
public’s consciousness.131
In the nearly three years after the ADC brought the action against
Westchester County, the issue of housing segregation remained mostly
hidden from public view. The principal source of information to the public,
the media, paid very little attention to the case. In February 2007, the New
York Times reported that Westchester County had been sued over a lack of
affordable housing.132 The article quoted a Princeton University
demographer, Douglas Massey, who described how little the federal
government had done in the prior 12–15 years to redress housing
segregation.133 A week later, the New York Times published an editorial that
urged greater attention to the ongoing problems of class and ethnic
segregation in the New York suburbs “where the progress in building new
units has been meager and largely confined to communities with already
disproportionately healthy populations of people who are black and Hispanic,
poor and immigrant.”134 During the litigation between the ADC and
Westchester County, these were the only two reminders of housing
segregation’s persistence and government’s failure to satisfy the constitutional
imperative laid out in Brown v. Board of Education. For the public, housing
segregation remained a non-issue.
The catalyst for public engagement with housing segregation came when
HUD intervened in the case against Westchester County.135 HUD acting
under President George W. Bush refused to intervene in the ADC’s qui tam

129 See Schwemm, supra note 126, at 144-45 (describing how Congress strengthened the
Department of Housing and Urban Developments enforcement regime in its amendment to the
Fair Housing Act in 1988).
130 See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair
Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1198 (2011) (describing the persistence of housing segregation
after the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act).
131 A ProQuest search of current and historical newspapers found only 25 articles between 1980
and 2009 that mentioned “affirmatively further fair housing” or “affirmatively furthering fair
housing” the principal tool for fighting housing segregation.
132 See Ford Fessenden, County Sued Over Lack of Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/04wemain.html [https://perma.cc/
N7BW-SLLC].
133 Id.
134 See Editorial, Housing Carrots and Sticks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/11/opinion/nyregionopinions/WEHousing.html [https://perma.cc/ASX7-WUL4].
135 Id.
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action.136 But after the District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied Westchester County’s motion to dismiss and then its motion for
summary judgment,137 HUD acting under President Barack Obama
intervened at the request of the county that sought to avoid $180 million in
liability.138 The Department’s intervention resulted in a settlement mandating
greater residential integration by requiring the County to build 750 affordable
housing units in mostly white neighborhoods.139 When HUD determined
that Westchester County was falling short of its settlement obligations, HUD
took another aggressive step and withheld federal housing funds under the
Community Development Block Grant.140
HUD’s actions to enforce what had previously been considered a toothless
regulation under the AFFH were unprecedented. According to Westchester
County Executive Andrew Spano, the County’s settlement with HUD
represented “a ‘sea change in American policy,’ . . . because it guarantee[d]
access to fair and affordable housing ‘all over,’ as opposed to guaranteeing
access in certain areas.”141 Fair housing advocates agreed, viewing the
settlement as a critical and long overdue step to enforcing a law designed to
eliminate housing segregation.142

136 See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
at 1, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cty.
(S.D.N.Y. April 17, 2007) (No. 06 2860), 2007 WL 1622360, at *1 (noting the government’s decision
to decline to intervene in the Anti-Discrimination Center’s suit against Westchester County).
137 See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester
Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying Westchester County’s motion for
summary judgment); United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York v.
Westchester Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying Westchester County’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
138 See Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of its Application to
Intervene in this Action, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v.
Westchester Cty. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009) (No. 06 2860), 2009 WL 2899691; see also Nick Timiraos,
Wealthy Suburbs Accept Low-Income Homes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB124993778549420475 [https://perma.cc/RYY4-VV3X] (“The settlement with the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban Development ended a $180
million federal lawsuit brought by the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York . . . over
Westchester’s responsibility to enforce fair-housing laws.”).
139 See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester
Cty., No. 06 2860, 2011 WL 7563042, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011).
140 See Shelly Banjo, Westchester in HUD Squeeze: Agency Calls Local Officials’ Housing Plans Inadequate,
WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023042033045764484038
01182500 [https://perma.cc/87GV-6SVY] (describing HUD’s rejection of Westchester County’s
affordable housing plan and withholding of “$7.3 million in yearly federal housing funds allocated to
the county”).
141 See Timiraos, supra note 138.
142 See, e.g., Craig Gurian, Letter to the Editor, The Court is Right About Westchester County Housing,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020468320457435634043
6871178 [https://perma.cc/T97C-MNDC] (“[T]he settlement both creates real consumer choice and,
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The unprecedented intervention brought national public attention to
housing segregation for the first time in decades.143 In the immediate days
after the settlement, the media targeted the persistent problems of housing
segregation and the accompanying harms that arose from it. The Wall Street
Journal interviewed HUD Deputy Secretary Ron Sims, who pointed to the
lawsuit as evidence of the “‘significant amount of racial segregation’ in
Westchester” and described studies showing that “zip codes could
increasingly serve as a predictor of life expectancy and illness.”144 Sims
concluded with an appeal “to remove zip codes as a factor in the quality of
life in America.”145 The New York Times quoted Craig Gurian, executive
director of the Anti-Discrimination Center, who followed in the path of
President Lyndon Johnson by drawing the link between housing segregation
and other forms of racial disadvantage. “Residential segregation,” Gurian
explained, “underlies virtually every racial disparity in America, from
education to jobs to the delivery of health care.”146
In the years following HUD’s intervention, the public through the media
engaged in dialogue about the history of housing segregation. Newspaper
articles reminded people of the degree of racial residential segregation and
how we got here. Articles described federal and state governments’ social
engineering of segregation through their enforcement of racial restrictive
covenants, neighborhood redlining practices, and the siting and segregation

41 years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, takes an important step toward ending the legacy
of ‘two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal.’”).
143 In contrast to the 25 newspaper articles found in a ProQuest search of current and historical
newspapers between 1980 and 2009 that mentioned the principal tool for fighting housing
segregation, “affirmatively further fair housing” or “affirmatively furthering fair housing,” using
those same search terms yielded 132 articles between 2009 and the present.
144 Timiraos, supra note 135.
145 Id. In a follow up Wall Street Journal blog after the Westchester County settlement with
HUD, journalist Nick Timiraos asked his readers the following questions: “[H]ow diverse are your
communities? Do you think your communities could face similar scrutiny?” Nick Timiraos, Westchester
Settlement: “Removing ZIP Code as Quality of Life Factor”, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2009), https://
blogs.wsj.com/developments/2009/08/11/westchester-settlement-removing-zip-code-as-quality-of-lifefactor/ [https://perma.cc/2M3N-ABY4]. In an answer to the questions, a blog poster expressed
opposition to the HUD Deputy Secretary’s idea of removing zip codes as a factor in the quality of
life in America. The blog poster argued that “[t]aken to its logical conclusion, this idea would
eliminate any income or housing quality distinction between different parts of town.” That means,
according to the blog post, “[i]t would eliminate the distinctions in culture that brought those who
live in a more expensive part of town to where they’re at . . . [and it] would eliminate the incentive
to work towards upward social mobility.” Don Warrington, Removing Zip Code as a Quality of Life
Factor, POSITIVE INFINITY (Nov. 6, 2009), https://www.vulcanhammer.org/2009/11/06/removingzip-code-as-a-quality-of-life-factor/ [https://perma.cc/U8GR-2FLC].
146 Sam Roberts, Westchester Adds Housing to Desegregation Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/nyregion/11settle.html [https://perma.cc/3BTK-J82B].
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of public housing, among other discriminatory practices.147 Media accounts
recalled for the public the history and purpose of the Fair Housing Act.
Articles recounted how the findings from the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders, also known as the Kerner Commission, inspired the Fair
Housing Act.148 The Kerner Commission attributed the riots and unrest in
major cities during the 1960s to residential segregation “sustained and made
worse by federal policies that concentrated poor black citizens in ghettoes”
with little or no educational or employment opportunities.149 The report
warned in a famous passage that newspapers picked up again after HUD’s
intervention into the Westchester County litigation that “[o]ur Nation is
moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”150
Media outlets recognized the rooting out of residential segregation as a
purpose of the Fair Housing Act.151 They informed the public about the Act’s
failure due in part to executive under-enforcement of the Fair Housing Act
mandates.152 The combined effect of multiple Presidents’ lack of political will

147 See, e.g., Daniel Denvir, Separation Anxiety, PHILA. WEEKLY, March 16, 2011, at 10-12 (showing
that black, Latino, and Asian people continue to be segregated from white people as they move into the
suburbs); Jane Smith, What Exactly is “Fair Housing?”, RECORDER, April 4, 2014, at A.6.
148 See, e.g., Editorial Board, Housing Apartheid, American Style, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/opinion/sunday/housing-apartheid-american-style.html
[https://perma.cc/9SH7-LX6P] (describing the findings of the Kerner Commission); see also Troutt,
supra note 125, at 22 (“[T]he Kerner Commission Report was especially influential in crafting the Fair
Housing Act . . . .”).
149 See Editorial Board, Housing Apartheid, American Style, supra note 148. The Kerner
Commission pointedly determined that “white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.” NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON DISORDERS 1 (1968).
150 NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 149; see also Editorial, The
Battle for Westchester, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/
13/opinion/sunday/the-battle-for-westchester.html [https://perma.cc/DGJ4-232A] (describing how
America has become more diverse in the years since the passage of the Fair Housing Act and that
while “many of the barriers that kept communities separate and unequal have eroded . . . the fight
against unlawful discrimination has not ended”).
151 See, e.g., Charlene Crowell, Will Federal Lawmakers Turn the Clock Back on Fair Housing?,
NEW ORLEANS TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.theneworleanstribune.com/main/will-federallawmakers-turn-back-the-clock-on-fair-housing/ [https://perma.cc/4WKA-YXUA] (describing as
one of the purposes of the Act “forg[ing] inclusive and diverse communities as a means to reverse
America’s housing history of segregation and Jim Crow”).
152 See Editorial Board, Housing Apartheid, American Style, supra note 148 (describing how HUD’s
failure to enforce the Fair Housing Act left segregated metropolitan areas with large black populations);
Emily Badger, Obama Administration to Unveil Major New Rules Targeting Segregation Across U.S., WASH.
POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/08/obama-administrationto-unveil-major-new-rules-targeting-segregation-across-u-s/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2cd0607fb663
[https://perma.cc/TY3A-93XH] (“[A] mandate [to actively dismantle segregation and foster integration]
for decades has been largely forgotten, neglected, and unenforced.”).
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and opposition to the anti-discrimination and desegregation goals of the Act,
newspapers noted, contributed to this weak enforcement of the Act.153
Descriptions of the history of housing segregation and the Fair Housing Act
led to thick, empirically driven media accounts of the persistence of such
segregation. Mainstream media outlets covered studies of housing segregation
once left to the annals of academic journals.154 Reports about the index of
dissimilarity, a measure of residential segregation, identified the degree of
segregation throughout the country and shifts in segregation patterns, from the
“white flight” to the suburbs of the past to the gentrification of city
neighborhoods in the present.155 Newspapers reported on studies about the
relationship between segregation and other forms of racial disadvantage, such as
education and employment disparities and differences in exposure to crime.156
The most important connection drawn from the perspective of
constitutionalism was that between the segregation of housing and schools
and the concomitant differences in educational opportunity and outcomes.
What was old and broadly known in the 1960s became new and more widely
shared after HUD intervened in 2009. In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson
submitted a message to Congress proposing the enactment of a precursor to
what became the Fair Housing Act that described the “complicated chain of

See, e.g., Badger, supra note 152.
See, e.g., Editorial Board, America’s Federally Financed Ghettos, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/opinion/sunday/americas-federally-financed-ghettos.html [https://
perma.cc/JF5L-8267] (re-introducing the findings from sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy
Denton’s seminal work, “American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass”);
Editorial Board, The Architecture of Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/the-architecture-of-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/9PM7-3W6W]
(describing and citing findings from public policy professor and housing segregation expert Paul
Jargowsky); Mark Trumbull, Obama Puts “Fair Housing” on Agenda: Why Segregation Still Matters,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 8, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2015/0708/Obama-putsfair-housing-on-agenda-Why-segregation-still-matters [https://perma.cc/937T-MXEK] (describing
findings from economists Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren identifying the benefits for children of
reducing segregation and concentrated poverty).
155 See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Why are African Americans Better Off in San Diego than St. Louis?
Fair Housing, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sanderfair-housing-act-20180415-story.html [https://perma.cc/VH7V-XC5Q] (describing the index of
dissimilarity and identifying the degree of segregation in major metropolitans).
156 See, e.g., Emily Badger, Housing Segregation is Holding Back the Promise of Brown v. Board of
Education, WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2014/05/15/housing-segregation-is-holding-back-the-promise-of-brown-v-board-of-education/?noredire
ct=on [https://perma.cc/X8MP-AXPD] (identifying the relationship between housing segregation and
educational disadvantage); Emily Badger & John Eligon, Trump Administration Postpones an Obama FairHousing Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/upshot/trump-delayshud-fair-housing-obama-rule.html [https://perma.cc/JM96-WRK2] (quoting legal expert on segregation
Myron Orfield as concluding that “[a]ll of the disparities in the U.S.—in education, in income, wealth,
employment, health—between the races are all fundamentally linked to residential segregation”).
153
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discrimination and lost opportunities.”157 As President Johnson explained,
“[e]mployment is often dependent on education, education on neighborhood
schools and housing, housing on income, and income on employment. . . . All
the links—poverty, lack of education, underemployment, and now
discrimination in housing—must be attacked together.”158 For forty years
after Johnson’s speech, the public mostly ignored the role of housing
discrimination in the chain of discrimination and lost opportunity, until the
issue returned to the forefront of the public debate after HUD’s intervention.
Mirroring the views of President Johnson, ADC Executive Director Craig
Gurian explained that “[r]esidential segregation underlies virtually every
racial disparity in America, from education to jobs to the delivery of health
care.”159 In a letter to the editor, a former HUD Administrator praised the
New York Times for placing “housing segregation and racism at the heart of
our urban problem” and then reaffirmed that “[i]t’s about everything that goes
with [housing segregation and discrimination]: joblessness, crime, drugs,
underperforming schools, crumbling infrastructure, inadequate public
services—the list goes on.”160
As with all public dialogues at the center of popular constitutional
debates, there were opponents who took a differing view of housing
segregation and HUD’s response to it, a perspective that also played out in
the media. While supporters of HUD’s intervention linked persistent
housing segregation to past discriminatory state actions, those opposed to
federal involvement argued that segregation was a product of choice and
income. An anonymous editorial in the Wall Street Journal written days after
HUD’s intervention into the action against Westchester County challenged
the assumption that the low presence of racial and ethnic minorities in certain
Westchester towns was the result of discrimination. The author noted that
“there’s no pattern of fair housing complaints or other evidence showing that
black families with incomes similar to whites in more upscale neighborhoods
were barred from those jurisdictions.”161 The integration of black and Latinos
into suburban Westchester towns was increasing, the editorial argued, “as the
household incomes of those groups rise.”162 Another Wall Street Journal
article titled “HUD’s Racial Agenda” quoted statements from conservative
Message from the President, supra note 126.
Id.
Roberts, supra note 146.
Alan Goldfarb, Letter to the Editor, Moving to End Housing Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (May
20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/opinion/moving-to-end-housing-segregation.html
[https://perma.cc/7DGH-444T].
161 Anonymous, Color-Coding the Suburbs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970203863204574346862154177606 [https://perma.cc/CSH5-PUQX].
162 Id.
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members of the United States Commission of Civil Rights, who asserted that
“legal segregation has been dead for over forty years” and that “geographic
clustering of racial and ethnic groups is not in and of itself an invidious
phenomenon.”163 The article then editorialized that “if Asian or black or white
communities voluntarily choose to live together, that’s perfectly legal.”164 A
later Wall Street Journal article cited unnamed “research” showing that “for
decades large majorities of blacks have no desire to live in all-white or even
mostly white neighborhoods and strongly prefer to live where at least half of
the other residents are black” as an argument against “the federal government
. . . forcing wealthy Westchester municipalities to import low-income
minorities.”165
The opponents of HUD’s actions accused the agency of engaging in social
engineering. A New York Times editorial in 2012 quoted a Republican
candidate for a United States Senate seat in New York, who accused President
Obama and HUD of “trying to ‘socially engineer’ rich communities into
accepting poorer people.”166 A Washington Post editorial titled “Obama
Wants to Reengineer Your Neighborhood” accused HUD of using the
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing mandate to “force communities to
diversify.”167 Such forced integration, another critic argued, would create or
heighten racial tensions.168
A final criticism pitted HUD’s federal anti-segregation efforts against the
principle of local control. Robert Astorino, the Westchester County executive
responsible for implementing the HUD settlement, tried to rally opponents
through the use of federalism-infused arguments. A media outlet quoted
Astorino as claiming that “Washington bureaucrats, who you will never see
or meet, want the power to determine who will live where and how each

163 See Mary Kissel, HUD’s Racial Agenda, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/huds-racial-agenda-1379516023 [https://perma.cc/DS57-28KP] (quoting Commissioners Abigail
Thernstrom, Peter Kirsanow, and Todd Gaziano).
164 Id.
165 Jason L. Riley, Obama Wants to Pick the Clintons’ Neighbors, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2015), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/obama-wants-to-pick-the-clintons-neighbors-1434494645 [https://perma.cc/38N8
-N7G6].
166 Editorial, The Battle for Westchester, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/13/opinion/sunday/the-battle-for-westchester.html [https://perma.cc/DGJ4-232A] (quoting
New York Republican Senate candidate Bob Turner).
167 Marc A. Thiessen, Obama Wants to Reengineer Your Neighborhood, WASH. POST (June 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-wants-to-reengineer-your-neighborhood/2015/06/1
5/f7c0c558-1366-11e5-9518-f9e0a8959f32_story.html?utm_term=.67ade5614aeb [https://perma.cc/55AYDAKS].
168 See Anonymous, supra note 161.
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neighborhood will look.”169 For Astorino, “[w]hat’s at stake is the fundamental
right of our cities, towns, and villages to plan and zone for themselves.”170 In
a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Astorino tried to stoke longstanding fears about
centralized housing by suggesting to the reader that HUD was seeking
“unchecked power to put an apartment building in your neighborhood.”171
Then, combining arguments about federal control and social engineering,
Astorino went on to assert that HUD “wants the power to dismantle local
zoning so communities have what it considers the right mix of economic,
racial and ethnic diversity.”172 Letters to the editor and other editorials in the
Wall Street Journal agreed with Astorino’s characterization of HUD’s efforts
to address housing segregation as an assault on local control.173
In the midst of this public dialogue about the history and persistence of
housing segregation and the public debate about its sources and effects, HUD
proposed and adopted a rule to enforce the Fair Housing Act’s Affirmatively
Furthering Fair housing mandate.174 The Supreme Court also reaffirmed the
desegregation purposes of the Act.175 The relationship between the public
dialogue and debate, the HUD rule, and the Supreme Court’s decision is
impossible to prove definitively. But the correlation between the public
169 Peter Applebome, Showdown for Westchester and U.S. Over Desegregation Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/nyregion/us-gives-westchesterdeadline-to-comply-with-housing-pact.html [https://perma.cc/6J8U-TQQW].
170 Id.
171 Robert P. Astorino, Washington’s “Fair Housing” Assault on Local Zoning, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
5, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/washingtons-fair-housing-assault-on-local-zoning-1378422087
[https://perma.cc/58WH-8FY9].
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Letters to the Editor, HUD Zoning: Coming Soon to a Neighborhood Near You, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hud-zoning-coming-soon-to-a-neighborhoodnear-you-1379262411 [https://perma.cc/WAA9-G5QB] (expressing opposition to HUD’s attempt to
“promote racial harmony by inserting many more low-income housing units that don’t comply with
local zoning laws in affluent suburbs”);Riley, supra note 165 (“What is at stake [with HUD’s action]
is the loss of locally controlled residential zoning, and more such federal relocation edits are almost
certainly on the way.”); Thiessen, supra note 167 (“Putting decisions about how local communities
are run in the hands of federal bureaucracy is an assault on freedom.”).
174 HUD proposed the Affirmatively Further Fair Housing rule in 2013 and it received over
1,000 comments. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,276
(2015). HUD published the final rule in 2015. Among other things, the rule replaced the weakly
enforced and vague requirement that participants undertake an analysis of impediments to fair
housing. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY GRANTS:
HUD NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF JURISDICTIONS’ FAIR
HOUSING PLANS 9 (2010) (describing the problems with the analysis of impediments to fair
housing). In its stead, the rule established “a more effective and standardized Assessment of Fair
Housing through which program participants identify and evaluate fair housing issues, and factors
contributing to fair housing issues.” Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed Reg. at 42,273.
175 See Texas Dep’t of Housing & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2515-25 (2015) (upholding the Fair Housing Act’s disparate-impact standard on the basis of the
history and persistence of segregation that the Act was intended to eradicate).
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dialogue and debate, the adoption of the first HUD rule to enforce the
AFFH, and the conservative Supreme Court’s surprising decision to embrace
HUD’s disparate-impact standard of liability for housing discrimination to
support the goal of desegregation is noteworthy.
Although the HUD rule imposed extremely modest requirements on
recipients of federal housing funding, it served as a catalyst for further public
debate. Supporters saw the rule as a first step toward more robust
enforcement of the AFFH desegregation mandate.176 Opponents viewed it as
more social engineering and a further assault on local control.177 For the first
time in decades, HUD’s rule drew attention to housing segregation in a
presidential contest. A day after HUD issued its rule, Republican presidential
candidate Ben Carson described HUD-enforced housing desegregation as a
form of social engineering.178 A few months later, the Republican Party joined
in the backlash against the rule. The GOP in its 2016 platform accused the
Obama administration of “trying to seize control of the zoning process
through its Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing regulation” and
“threaten[ing] to undermine zoning laws in order to socially engineer every
community in the country.”179 The Democratic Party platform responded
with a promise to “defend[] and strengthen[] the Fair Housing Act.”180
Donald Trump’s subsequent election as president opened the door to a
rollback of HUD’s desegregation efforts during the Obama administration.
The rollback started with the appointment of Ben Carson to serve as secretary
of HUD,181 and culminated with the suspension of the HUD rule enforcing

176 See, e.g., Editorial Board, The End of Federally Financed Ghettos, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/opinion/the-end-of-federally-financed-ghettos.html [https://
perma.cc/QC8W-JLLM] (describing the new HUD rule and suggesting that it represented a step
toward ending federally financed segregation); Trumbull, supra note 154 (acknowledging that the
HUD rule “doesn’t sound revolutionary” but suggesting that the data and tools that it will equip
cities with to address segregation will change expectations surrounding the role of the Fair Housing
Act in eradicating segregation).
177 See Emily Badger, How Ben Carson Could Undo a Desegregation Effort, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/upshot/how-ben-carson-at-housing-could-undo-a-desegregationeffort.html [https://perma.cc/A23R-2KM9] (“[Ben] Carson and other critics call efforts to dismantle
poor, segregated communities as ‘social engineering’ . . . .”).
178 See Editorial Board, Ben Carson’s Warped View of Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/opinion/ben-carsons-warped-view-of-housing.html [https://
perma.cc/BW3V-Y6GS].
179 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 4 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/
documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BKF-BNP5].
180 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 5 (2016), https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE8J-QCUE].
181 See Jeffrey Sparshott, U.S. Senate Confirms Ben Carson as Housing and Urban Development
Secretary, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-senate-confirms-ben-carsonas-housing-and-urban-development-secretary-1488469893 [https://perma.cc/8L7D-ABJJ].

1820

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1783

AFFH and the shift away from integration as a goal for housing policy.182 In
some respects, the rollback has left us back where we began when HUD
intervened in the Westchester County litigation. Prior to the intervention,
HUD had done little to enforce the Fair Housing Act’s desegregation
mandate, and in the current context the Trump administration seems
interested in reducing the federal role in advancing housing integration.183
But in one critical respect, the public discourse pre-Westchester County looks
very different from that of today. Prior to HUD’s intervention into
Westchester County, there was very little public attention and virtually no
public dialogue about housing desegregation, an issue of enormous
constitutional import that has not been adequately addressed. The HUD
intervention into Westchester County inspired a popular constitutional
debate, with advancement in constitutional rights claims and backlash against
them that are typical of most popular constitutional rights movements. This
popular debate has not yet concluded, but without an administrative agency
as the catalyst, it likely would have never begun.
CONCLUSION
As a descriptive project, the current accounts of popular constitutionalism
are incomplete. Popular constitutional theorists provide a persuasive account
for constitutionalism in the first century and a half of the American republic,
when frequent popular movements, congressional and presidential
interventions into constitutional disputes, and state advancement of, and
resistance to, constitutional values all effectively competed with courts as
focal points for constitutional interpretive disputes.184 But for most of the
182 See Emily Badger & John Eligon, supra note 156 (reporting on the Trump administration’s
suspension of HUD’s Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing rule until 2020); Glenn Thrush, Under
Ben Carson, HUD Scales Back Fair Housing Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/us/ben-carson-hud-fair-housing-discrimination.html [https://perma.
cc/S5LS-JAR9] (reporting on the Trump Administration’s efforts “to scale back federal efforts to
enforce fair housing laws, freezing enforcement actions against local governments and
businesses . . . while sidelining officials who have aggressively pursued civil rights cases”).
183 See Laura Kusisto, HUD Moves to Shake Up Fair-Housing Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hud-moves-to-shake-up-fair-housing-enforcement-1534161601
[https://perma.cc/2ZVQ-XQSV] (“The Trump administration wants to shift the way it enforces an
aspect of fair housing around the U.S., pivoting away from efforts to integrate lower-income housing
into wealthier neighborhoods in favor of promoting more housing development overall.”).
184 See generally Kramer, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 6 (focusing mostly on
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century examples of popular constitutionalism). The Chicago-Kent Law
Review hosted a symposium on Kramer’s work in which the descriptive accounts of popular
constitutionalism focused mostly on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century examples of popular
constitutionalism. See generally Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism
and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006); Mark A. Graber, Popular
Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debate, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
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past century, constitutional change has far outpaced the efforts of these
popular actors and institutions. A popular constitutionalism for the modern
era requires a recognition of both the role of agencies as constitutional actors,
as loci for popular input in constitutional meaning determinations, and as
catalysts for popular debate about the Constitution. In fact, in a context in
which social movement activity is infrequent, Congress is dysfunctional, and
the President for the most part stays out of constitutional disputes,
administrative agencies are arguably the lead popular constitutional actors
that compete with the constitutional supremacy of the courts.
It is the hope that this Article will serve as a starting point for
understanding administrative agencies’ roles as popular constitutional actors.
The role of HUD as a catalyst for a popular constitutional debate on the
government’s mandate to combat the constitutional harm of segregation is just
one of many examples from the recent era. Attorney General Eric Holder’s
attack on Voter ID laws, which served as a catalyst for popular debate about
the constitutional right to vote, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Clean Power Plan that triggered a popular debate about separation of powers
and executive authority, are both other very recent examples of such actions
by administrative agencies that are ripe for further examination.185 Once we
account for the role of administrative agencies in popular constitutionalism,
we can also more completely re-engage the normative debate about who
should exercise control over the meaning of the Constitution.

983 (2006); Daniel W. Hamilton, Popular Constitutionalism in the Civil War: A Trial Run, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 953 (2006); Richard J. Ross, Pre-Revolutionary Popular Constitutionalism and Larry
Kramer’s The People Themselves, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 905 (2006).
185 See, e.g., Jason L. Riley, Cue the Voter ID Scaremongering, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204464404577112631828248266 [https://perma.cc/
5EL8-K75A] (presenting one of the first newspaper accounts of the Department of Justice’s review
of Voter ID laws under the Voting Rights Act and Attorney General Eric Holder’s role as the lead
actor spearheading the review); Benjamin Zycher, Obama and the EPA: It’s About Rewarding Friends
and Punishing Enemies, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oezycher-epa-global-warming-20140610-story.html [https://perma.cc/G5RY-9ZY2] (providing an account
of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and the popular debate about separation of powers that it sparked).
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